Constantinople - The Citadel at the Gate

Constantinople - The Citadel at the Gate by Comer Plummer, III
window.google_render_ad();
The art of fortification is a clear reflection of our past. It bears witness to our roots as a race of mutually hostile societies, and impresses upon us the determination of a people to defend themselves. It has existed ever since man first came to realize the value of natural obstacles to his common defense, and evolved as he sought to invoke his own methods to fully exploit this advantage. The building of barriers rapidly evolved from the simple mud parapets and mountain top abodes of the Neolithic Age to the construction of linear and point stone obstacles of the Bronze Age, best represented by the Hittite capital of Hattusas. The Greco-Roman world was the proving ground for medieval fortifications. When, in A.D. 324, Roman Emperor Constantine I moved the capital of the empire from Rome to the sleepy port town of Byzantium, the full possibility of this science was at hand. The results of what followed shaped the course of world history. Located on a horn-shaped peninsula astride the Bosphorus and the Sea of Marmara, Constantinople dominated the narrow waterway that divides Europe from Asia. The complexities of this geography provided both advantages and challenges to the defense. A steep and rugged shoreline and the swift currents of the Sea of Marmara protected the southern coast. To the north, the Golden Horn, an inlet that bordered the peninsula, was a natural anchorage and harbor. The ancient Lycus River ran diagonally northwest to southeast across the peninsula, forming a narrow valley that sectioned the city into two distinct areas - a chain of six hills running along the Golden Horn to the north, and a single, larger hill to the south. A coherent urban defense had to address these considerations. For the most part, the many leaders and builders of the city succeeded in mastering the terrain. The ruins that still enclose Istanbul are the remnants of centuries of evolution. Awe inspiring even in decay, they are a testament to the glory of Greco-Roman military art.[1] The despair of her enemies, the walls of Constantinople were the most famous of the medieval world, singular not only in scale, but in construction and the design and integration of the defense with natural obstacles. The principal composition of the walls was mortared rubble, faced with blocks of fitted limestone, and reinforced by courses of layered red brick. To enhance the integrity of the overall network, the towers and walls were built independently of one another. The entire city was enclosed in a defensive circuit of 14 miles of walls, reinforced by 300 towers and bastions, and several strong points and fortresses. The strongest construction faced west, against an approach by land. Here, along a 4-mile stretch of rolling land, stands the legendary Theodosian Walls. Here an enemy had to attack a linear obstacle of four belts, each ascending above the other, with a depth of some 200 feet. The main line of defense was the Inner Wall, 40 feet in height, 15 feet thick, with a battlemented parapet of 5 feet high, which was accessed by stone ramps. Along its course run 96 massive towers, at intervals of 175 feet, each once capable of mounting the heaviest military engines of the day. A second, Outer Wall of approximately 30 feet in height is joined to this main wall by an elevated 60-foot terrace. The Outer Wall is equipped with 96 bastions, each offset from the towers of the Inner Wall so to avoid masking their fires. Subterranean passages run from many of these points back toward the city, avenues that presumably provided the secure movement of troops to and from a threatened area. The belts were constructed at a tiered elevation, starting at 30 feet for the Inner Wall and descending to the moat. This, and the distance between strong points, ensured that an attacker, once within the network, was in range from all immediate points in the defense. From the Outer Wall extended another 60-foot terrace, ending in a 6-foot high parapet. This bordered a great moat of some 60 feet in width and 15-30 feet in depth, supplied by an aqueduct system. To compensate for the rolling terrain, this moat was sectioned by a number of dams, which enabled it to retain an even distribution of water along its length. The five public gates that traversed this moat by way of drawbridges were set narrowly into the walls and were flanked by towers and bastions. Any assault made on the outer gates would be attacking into the strength of the defense. The Land Walls were anchored at both extremities by two great fortresses. Along the Sea of Marmara, the Castle of the Seven Towers secured the southern approach, while in the north, along the Golden Horn, the salient that was the quarter of the Blachernae Palace, residence of the later Byzantine Emperors, was gradually transformed into one massive fortress. To these two fortified points were adjoined the Sea Walls, similar in construction to the Outer Wall, of which little remains today. The Golden Horn posed a certain challenge for the defense, since the five miles of sea walls in this area were comparatively weak, and the calm waters here could provide an enemy fleet safe anchorage. Leo III provided the tactical solution in the form of the famous barrier chain. Made of giant wooden links that were joined by immense nails and heavy iron shackles, in an emergency a ship could deploy the chain across the waters of Golden Horn from the Kentenarion Tower in the south to the Castle of Galata on the north bank. Securely anchored on both ends, with its length guarded by Byzantine warships at anchor in the harbor, the great chain was a formidable obstacle and a vital element of the city’s defenses. While the Land Walls glorify the name of Theodosius I (408-450), the reigning Roman emperor at the time their construction began, it is to one of history’s dim figures, Anthemius, to whom they owe their genesis. Anthemius, as Prefect of the East, was the head of government for six years during the minority of Theodosius and it was he who conceived and carried out a massive and defining expansion of the city defenses. His vision would provide a durable framework for a citadel the new capital would need to become to weather the challenges that lay ahead. The cornerstone of these new fortifications was a massive land wall, represented by the Inner Wall, built in 413. The Theodosian system was completed in 447 with the addition of an outer wall and moat - a response to a nearly calamity, when a devastating earthquake seriously damaged the walls and toppled 57 towers at the very moment Attila and his armies were bearing down on Constantinople. Over the centuries many emperors improved the city fortifications. Their names can be seen to this day engraved on the stone, roughly thirty of them covering more that a millenium, clearly illustrating the importance of these defenses to the Empire.[2] Constantinople would weather many challenges. While Attila drew away from the city to pursue an easier prey, others were not so discouraged. The Persians, Avars, Sacracens, Bulgarians, Russians and others in turn tried to take the citadel. Far from a deterrent, Constantinople’s reputation seemed to attract her enemies. As a capital of a mighty empire, and at the crossroads of two continents, Constantinople represented to the early medieval world what Rome and Athens had meant to classical times. The “Queen of Cities”, she was a magnet for pilgrim, trader, and conqueror alike. None were wanting. Over a millenium, the citadel turned back besieging armies seventeen times. With each succeeding onslaught, Constantinople became the final stronghold of Greek civilization. Behind her bulwark in the east, Christendom also took shelter.[3] Undoubtedly, her greatest hour came in turning back a series of determined Arab attacks during the initial period of Islamic expansion. In 632, the Muslim armies burst forth from the desert confines of the Hejaz and poured forth into the Levant. Benefiting from a power vacuum in the region, the Arab armies made stunning advances. The Byzantine and Sassanid Persian empires, nearly prostrate from 25 years of mutual warfare (fighting which cost the Greeks alone some 200,000 men, an enormous drain of manpower in this age) were unable to hold back the tide. In a little more than a decade the Byzantines were driven from Syria, Palestine, Mesopotamia, and Egypt. The Persians fared worse. Arab armies invaded the Persian highlands and destroyed Sassanid Empire. By 661, the standard of the Prophet reached from Tripoli to India. On two occasions, from 674 to 677, and again in 717-8, Arab armies besieged Constantinople by land and sea. Superior military organization, the leadership of Leo III (the Isaurian) and the timely intervention of one of history’s most decisive weapons – a medieval napalm dubbed “Greek fire” - enabled the Byzantines to weather the storm. The cost to both sides was high. Byzantium lost most of her territory south of the Taurus Mountains and much of the remainder of the Empire lay devastated. The Arabs lost untold thousands through futile attacks against the defenses of Constantinople, and a series of disastrous defeats on land and sea. Still many more perished of disease and cold before in dire encampments before the Land Walls. Of the 200,000 Muslims who laid siege to Constantinople in 717-718, only 30,000 crossed back into Syria the following year.[4] The impact of Byzantium’s successful defense against the Muslims cannot be overstated. The defense of Constantinople saved not only the Byzantine Empire from the same fate as Sassanid Persia, but spared a fractured and chaotic Europe a Moslem invasion for another nine centuries. One can only wonder of the consequences for Europe and Christendom had Muslims armies marched unchecked into Thrace in the late Seventh or early Eighth Centuries. Our history may have been quite different. What is certain is that the Muslim tide, broken at it shortest approach, was channeled to Europe via another and much longer axis – North Africa. Crossing the Straits of Gibraltar, a Muslim army of 50,000 traversed Spain, crossed the Pyrenees and penetrated into the heart of France before, overextended, they were finally overcome by Charles Martel at Tours in 732. With its expansion stemmed, the Muslim world turned its energies to internal disputes that splintered the CaIiphate, providing medieval Europe a much-needed period of growth and consolidation.[5] In the end, the same spirit of ingenuity that created the fortifications of Constantinople would prove their undoing. The weaknesses of the defenses must have been obvious, since a series of attackers beginning with the Avars, had tried to exploit them. Interestingly, the salient problems lay along the strongest point – the Land Walls. At a point just south of the Blachernae quarter, a section called the Mesoteichion, the walls dip sharply into the Lycus Valley, exposing that area to enfilade fires from higher ground on the enemy side.[6] Apparently, the trace of the walls owed itself more to the need accommodate a growing population than a regard for the natural lines of terrain. Another problem was the region of the Blachernae Palace, a neglected salient in the original Land Walls. The fortifications here, while often improved, were never equal to those elsewhere in this area. Finally, the construction of the Sea Walls as a single-wall circuit reflected a reliance on natural obstacles and a navy. As long as the Byzantine Navy commanded the narrows of the Hellespont and the Bosphorus, an attack from this quarter was not feared.[7] This situation changed dramatically after 1071, the year Rum Seljuks inflicted a decisive defeat upon the Greeks at Manzikert. As the Empire passed into decline, the Byzantine emperors could no longer maintain a robust navy, and they gradually fell into a reliance on the protection of friendly maritime powers. As the Byzantine Navy withered, Constantinople lay exposed to an assault from the sea. The challenge was not long in coming. The first Crusades were a marriage of convenience for a Christendom deeply divided between the rival Catholic and Orthodox churches. During the Fourth Crusade this enmity erupted into open warfare when the Latins sought to exploit one of Byzantium’s many dynastic squabbles. While en route to Palestine, the leaders of the crusade, cash-strapped and never opposed to a little profiteering, took up an offer by Alexius, the son of deposed and imprisoned Byzantine Emperor Isaac II, to restore their throne. In exchange for overthrowing the usurper, Alexius promised 200,000 marks, generous trade concessions and troops for the coming campaign. The deal was struck and on July 17, 1203, the Crusaders attacked Constantinople by land and sea. That night, the usurper, Alexius III, fled and the next day Isaac and his son were crowned co-emperors. Their restoration would be short lived. In January 1204, resentful Byzantine nobles toppled the puppet rulers, and brought a defiant Alexius Ducas Mourtzouphlus to the throne. With no hope of securing Byzantine cooperation in the campaign and little chance of success without it, the Crusaders determined once more to take Constantinople.[8] The Latins, with a decisive naval advantage, decided to make a major effort at the Sea Walls. To provide an assault platform, they erected siege towers on their ships from which long spars were rigged as a kind of suspended bridge. When the ship approached to within range of the wall or tower to be attacked, the bridge was lowered and the knights would shimmy across. The task of leading such an assault must have been daunting. A knight, grasping for balance moving down a narrow platform high above a ship rolling at anchor, then lifting himself over the parapet, all while evading the arrows and cuts of the defenders, was at the mercy of his circumstances. When the first effort failed, for the second the Latins decided to attack with two ships tied together. This provided a more stable platform and the possibility of assaulting a tower at two points. A witness, Robert de Clari, described how the attackers gained a foothold: “The Venetian who entered first in the tower was on one of these suspended bridges with two knights, and from there, with the aid of his hands and feet, he was able to penetrate the level where the bridge provided access. There he was cut down; it was there that André d’Urboise penetrated in the same way when the ship, tossed by the current, touched the tower a second time.” The Latins had made the critical penetration. Another witness, Henri de Villehardouin, described how they exploited this success: “When the knights see this, who are in the transports, they land, raise their ladders against the wall, and scale to the top of the wall by main force, and so take four of the towers. And all begin to leap out of the ships and transports and galleys, helter-skelter, each as best he can; and they break in some three of the gates and enter in; and they draw the horses out of the transports; and the knights mount and ride straight to the quarters of the Emperor Mourtzouphlus.”[9] Many historians point to the Latin conquest of Constantinople in 1204 as the practical end of the Byzantine Empire. The Empire disintegrated into a number of feudal fiefdoms and rival kingdoms and despots. While the Greeks, who had established a rival kingdom across the Bosphorus in Nicea, returned to reclaim their capital in 1261, they would find it plundered, and most of their territory lost forever. The Fourth Crusade had shattered the citadel of Christendom in the East. Though treachery and resourcefulness could overcome the strongest of medieval fortifications, it would be the cannon that would render them obsolete. The Hundred Years War witnessed the emergence of this weapon as the decisive instrument of war on land. The Ottoman Turks, a principality that emerged in the late Fourteenth Century as the next great challenge to Byzantium, were in the forefront of this early technology. Mehmet II ascended the Turkish throne in 1451 with a burning desire to succeed where his father had failed 29 years before - capture Constantinople and make it the capital of his empire. By this time the Ottoman Empire had absorbed most of Byzantium and engulfed its capital as it expanded outward from Asia Minor into the Balkans. In his quest, Mehmet would not be limited to traditional methods of siegecraft, for the sultan’s armies had by that time acquired a large numbers of cannon. Armed with this technology, and a superior energy and vision, Mehmet would go further than others in exploring tactical solutions to the defenses of Constantinople. Reports circulating around the courts of Europe in the winter of 1452-3 spoke of “unprecedented” Turkish preparations for an assault upon the Constantinople. In fact, the Turkish army that appeared before the city on April 6, 1453 was singular in only one respect. With 80,000 soldiers, among them 15,000 of the Sultan’s elite Janissary Corps, Serbian miners, various siege engines, and a fleet of some 300-400 ships, it was a formidable force, though hardly anything the city had not seen many times before. It was artillery, however, that made this a potent threat. Salient was a new generation of massive siege artillery, courtesy of a Hungarian cannon founder named Urban. Abandoning the meager pay and resources of the Byzantines, Urban found in Mehmet an eager sponsor who set him to work casting large caliber cannon to breach the city walls. The Hungarian went about his work with equal enthusiasm, promising the sultan, “the stone discharged from my cannon would reduce to dust not only those walls, but even the walls of Babylon.” The resultant monster cannon was a weapon of terror. It was titanic, requiring 60 oxen and 200 soldiers to haul across Thrace from the foundry at Adrianople. Twenty-seven feet long, 2 ½ feet in caliber, the great cannon could hurl a 1,200-pound ball over a mile. When it was tested, a Turkish chronicler wrote that a warning went out to the Ottoman camp so that pregnant women would not abort at the shock.[10] Its explosions “made the city walls shake, and the ground inside.” The cannon’s size, however, was also its liability. Crewed by 500, it took 2 hours to load and could only fire eight rounds per day. Fortunately for the Turks, Mehmet had many more practical and more proven pieces - 12 large cannon and 18 batteries of 130 of a smaller caliber weapons.[11] Against traditional siege engines and complimented by adequate land and sea forces, the walls of Constantinople had proven impregnable. Times, however, had changed. The city had never recovered from the sacking by the Latins in 1204. Destitute and depopulated, she seemed resigned to her fate. Despite efforts of Emperor Constantine XI to rally volunteers, few answered the call. To make matters worse, the defenders’ resolve was undermined by deep divisions caused by the Emperor’s decision to re-unify the Orthodox with the Catholic Church as an incentive for its aid against the Turk. The Empire was at the end of its resources. The defense was left primarily to Italian troops. Greeks commanded only two of the nine sectors of the defense. Powder was in short supply and the walls had fallen into disrepair; the overseers had embezzled the funds for their maintenance. The fleet, long the critical arm of the Empire, now consisted of just three Venetian galliasses and twenty galleys. The few defenders faced a daunting task. Numbering 4,973 Greek soldiers and volunteers and another 2,000 foreigners, they had to defend fourteen miles of city walls and fortifications.[12] With 500 men detailed to defend the Sea Walls, this would have left only one man every four feet at the Outer Land Walls alone.[13] With many of the defenders in this area manning the engines, towers, bastions and other points, this defense was undoubtedly much thinner. The demands on each man grew precipitously as the battle progressed and as casualties, sickness, and desertion reduced their numbers, and substantial breaches appeared in the walls. That this scant force could defend for seven weeks a city that was one of the largest of the medieval world is remarkable and a testament to both these fortifications and the men who defended them. For weeks Turkish guns battered the Land Walls, in the words of witness Nicolo Barbaro, with a “great deal of cannon fire in the usual way, and such shouting that the very air seemed to be splitting apart”.[14] The high masonry walls were forlorn in this new age of warfare. They were an easy target for long-range enemy guns, and at the same time could not long withstand the recoil of their own cannon mounted upon them. While the monster cannon exploded on its fourth round, killing its builder and many of the crew, the Turks found in technique a more effective way to employ their artillery. Following the advice of a Hungarian envoy, Turkish gunners concentrated their fires against points on the wall and in a triangular pattern - two shots, one each to the base of the a 30-foot section, then a toppling shot to the top center.[15] In this way, the Turks gradually breached sections of the Outer Walls, exposing the Inner Wall, which too began to crumble. The defenders fought off Turkish attempts to assault the inner defenses. At night they crept forward to cobble in the widening holes with rubble and palisades. If the end was ever in doubt, Mehmet’s solving the problem of the barrier chain made the outcome inevitable. Unable to force a passage through the chain and past the Christian ships, Mehmet resolved to bypass it by hauling his ships overland, behind Galata and into the Golden Horn. To his engineers, who had hauled Urban’s cannon across Thrace, this posed little problem. Using greased windlasses and buffalo teams, the first ships made the trip on the night of April 22. The next morning the defenders awakened to find a squadron of Turkish vessels in the Horn and themselves with another five miles of sea walls to defend. Before the Greeks and their allies could mount an effective attack against this new threat, Mehmet had the Horn sealed to the west, before his ships, by building a floating bridge of giant oil casks and planks. The Christian ships were now bottled up in the Horn between two arms of the Moslem fleet.[16] The final blow came on May 29, 1453. The Turks attacked three hours before dawn, concentrating their effort on the Mesoteichion and the western half of the Sea Walls along the Horn. After seven weeks of heroic resistance, the defenders had reached the limits of endurance. In any case, their numbers were no longer sufficient to defend the Land Walls, sections of which were now reduced to rubble. A large beach was opened in the walls in the Lycus Valley and the Turks pressed the attack. Barbaro describes the final moments: “One hour before daybreak the Sultan had his great cannon fired, and the shot landed in the repairs which we had made and knocked them down to the ground. Nothing could be seen for the smoke made by the cannon, and the Turks, under the cover of the smoke, and about 300 of them got inside the barbicans.”[17] While the defenders beat back this attack, the next succeeded in infiltrating the Inner Wall. As Turkish soldiers appeared in their rear, the defenders’ nerve finally broke. The collapse was swift. As word rang out that the defenses had been breached, panic ensued. Those who did not take flight were overwhelmed at their posts. Constantine went to a hero’s death, struck down in the final melee near the great breach. A few managed to escape aboard the Christian ships. Most of the survivors, including nearly all of the population, were sold into slavery. After nearly a thousand years, the Byzantine Empire ceased to exist. Constantinople was reborn as Istanbul, and, as the capital of the Ottoman Empire its fortunes were reversed. Today the many splendors of Istanbul beckon, while the broken, overgrown remnants of its ancient defenses attract little interest. It is pertinent today, as we look upon the tragic history of the Balkans, to recognize the consequences for the West and the implications for the World had it not been for the citadel at the gate of Europe, whose defenses held the East at bay through the long night of the Dark Ages.
sources
MilitaryHistoryOnline.com

Bacon's Rebellion: America's First Revolutionary?

Bacon's Rebellion: America's First Revolutionary? by Walt Giersbach
window.google_render_ad();
Nathaniel Bacon was caught in a dilemma on a hot July day in 1676. The settlers’ avowed enemy, the Susquehannocks and their allies, were in front of him in the upper counties of Virginia while Governor William Berkeley’s English army and militia were getting ready to attack Bacon from the rear. Hundreds of landowners, indentured servants, slaves and other volunteers making up Bacon’s army waited for orders. Ever the strategist, the 29-year-old rebel addressed his army, “Gentlemen and fellow soldiers, the news just brought to me may not a little startle you as well as myselfe. The Governour is now in Gloster County endeavouring to raise forces against us, having declared us Rebells and Traytors…. They had rather wee should be Murder’d and our Ghosts sent to our slaughter’d Countrymen by their actings, than we should live to hinder them of their Interest with the Heathen.” [1] The aristocratic plantation owner and self-declared “General by Consent of the People” turned his army back to Jamestown—better to attack the Governor at once than have him hit them from the rear while engaged in the woods with the tribes. Mistakes on Every Side It’s difficult to look at 17th century American history without interpreting the clash of cultures as “grasping Europeans annihilating the Native American” or “angry savages attacking innocent settlers.” Bacon’s Rebellion, in 1675-76 Virginia, however, presents a complicated case of economic confusion, anti-authoritarian sentiment by colonists, grievous errors made by Virginia’s governor, and resentment by Native Americans.Hundreds of whites and Native Americans died, Jamestown was burned to the ground and the colonial government was in disarray before the Rebellion ended. It was a needless war that no one won and didn’t need to be fought. The conflict may also have sown the seeds of independence a century before the American Revolution. Years of Horrifying Hardships Virginians in the 1670s endured a multitude of problems. Tobacco prices were depressed when colonists were forbidden to sell to French customers and Dutch ships were blocked from trading with Virginia. Virginia’s House of Burgesses established perpetual slavery for blacks, but costs of growing tobacco still were higher than other crops. Maryland and the Carolinas were competing commercially against Virginia, the English market was constricting and finished goods from England were rising in price. The English Crown was paying for heavy losses in their naval war with the Dutch. On the Eastern seaboard, hailstorms, floods and hurricanes devastated the colonies. And politically, Governor Berkeley had co-opted the Council and avoided calling for new elections to the House of Burgesses. [2] While frustration ran high, Virginia’s elderly governor, Sir William Berkeley, was popular with King Charles II for evicting non-conformist Puritans and defeating the Dutch at what is now Wilmington, Delaware. He had also granted the Powhatan Indians rights to land near the York River. This bit of diplomacy brought peace, but at a price. Europeans, arriving in Virginia hoping to find cheap land, were upset to find the most prized land off limits. [3] In July 1675, a number of Doeg Indians raided Thomas Matthews’ plantation in the Northern Neck of Virginia near the Potomac River. Matthews supposedly had not paid for something he had obtained from the tribe. Several Doegs were killed in the fracas. This hadn’t been the first such Indian conflict, but tensions now reached a flashpoint. [4] In retaliation, colonists struck back. Nathaniel Bacon, a planter, rose as the natural leader of the outraged Virginians. Leading a ragtag group of angry farmers, slaves and indentured servants who had escaped from their masters, Bacon assaulted the Indians. [5] Unfortunately, the Virginians attacked Susquehannocks—perhaps the wrong tribe, but one which had ventured into Virginia and occupied the desired land. [6] The Susquehannocks struck back, killing 36 colonists to avenge their previous attack. [7] Governor Berkeley sharply condemned the attacks, seeing a dangerous escalation of tensions as well as an undoing of his diplomatic overtures in the new land. Berkeley was probably outraged as he rode into Bacon’s homestead at Henrico with 300 militia. Bacon, wisely, fled into the forest with some 200 volunteers, perhaps searching for a more equitable meeting place. Frustrated, the governor issued two petitions that declared Nathaniel Bacon a rebel but pardoned the volunteer Indian fighters if they returned home peacefully. Bacon would be given a fair trial for his disobedience, Berkeley stated, but would certainly be relieved of his Council seat. Bacon’s response was to attack an encampment of Occaneechee Indians on the Roanoke River between Virginia and North Carolina. The Occaneechee were enterprising people who were embroiled in their own squabble with the Susquehannocks. Bacon’s enemies now were not only Indians, but also soldiers of the king. Power Struggle Between Strong Personalities Born in Suffolk, England on Jan. 2, 1647, Nathaniel Bacon, Jr. had been called a troublemaker and schemer at home. His father, Thomas, sent him to the colonies in about 1672. His financial support allowed the 25-year-old man to purchase two estates on the James River. He settled at Curles, in Henrico County on the lower James. Intelligent and eloquent, Bacon was popular, but reportedly had no taste for labor. Coincidentally, Bacon was also related to the other chief player in the drama through the marriage of his cousin Lady Berkeley, Frances Culpeper. [8] Sir William Berkeley (pronounced BARK-lee) was a veteran of England’s civil wars, had fought in the Indian wars on the colonies’ frontier and was a favorite of King Charles I during his first term as governor of Virginia in the 1640s. When the English civil war ended in 1660 and the monarchy restored under Charles II, Berkeley was reappointed governor. At his home in Green Spring Plantation in James City County, he experimented with growing silk worms to supplant the colony’s reliance on tobacco. [9] But there was a darker side to the loyalist. He stated memorably, “I thank God there are no free schools, nor printing, and I hope we shall not have these hundred years; for learning has brought disobedience into the world, and printing has divulged them and libels against the best governments. God keep us from both!” [10] Berkeley respected Nathaniel Bacon as a fellow aristocrat when the young man arrived in Virginia, giving him a land grant and a seat on the Council. [11] Warfare, Personal and Political Governor Berkeley immediately investigated the Doeg and Susquehannock attacks, hoping to preserve friendship with the tribes while pacifying the settlers’ tempers. But, when he set up a parley between the aggrieved parties, several tribal chiefs were murdered. Bacon refused to heed caution, disregarded Berkeley’s direct orders, and seized friendly Appomattox Indians for supposedly stealing corn. This resulted in an official reprimand from the governor. at attempting to compromise, Berkeley relieved the tribes of their powder and ammunition. Turning to the second problem of pacifying the colonists, Berkeley called a “Long Assembly” in March 1676. The assembly declared war on the “bad” Indians and created a defensive zone around the settlements with a military chain of command. (The ensuing war also led to high taxes to support the soldiers and resentment from the colonists having to pay for it.) The Long Assembly’s bias led to a ruling over trade with the tribes. The favored traders, not coincidentally, were cronies and supporters of the governor. Independent traders, who had associated with the Indians for years, were no longer allowed to continue their commercial activities. A commission was created to oversee trade and ensure the Indians didn’t receive arms and ammunition. Nathaniel Bacon was not one of the traders favored by this “Tidewater Aristocracy.” He was also angry that the governor denied him a commission in the local militia. This didn’t stop Bacon from accepting unofficial appointment as “General” by local volunteer Indian fighters. [12] Governor Berkeley must have seethed at the insolence of a colonist demanding a commission, but knew it wouldn’t be prudent to absolutely refuse Bacon. He evaded the issue and sent representatives to persuade Bacon to disband. Bacon, for his part, had mustered a force of 500 men. He refused Berkeley’s order and marched to the falls of the James River. On May 29, Governor Berkeley declared that everyone who failed to return would be termed rebels. Many of Bacon’s men—land owners whose property could be confiscated—heeded the declaration and disbanded. Bacon, left with just 57 loyalists, continued upriver. With their provisions nearly exhausted, the band stumbled into the Occaneechee tribe led by Persicles in its fort on an island in the north branch of the James River. Persicles had accepted the Susquehannocks when the latter wandered in from the north, but they “being exercised in warr for many years with the Senecaes…endeavoured to beat the Ockanagees of their own Island.” Persicles was conferring with conquered Mannakin and Annelecton tribes people to surprise and cut off the Susquehannocks when Bacon appeared at the island fortress. [13] Bacon tried to buy provisions, but the tribe put them off for days. In fact, Persicles insisted the English execute his Susquehannock prisoners, which Bacon refused to do. As the last of the food gave out, Bacon’s men waded across a branch of the river to the fort, whereupon one of his men was shot. Suspecting the tribe had colluded with Berkeley, the rebels stormed the fortification, blew up the Indians’ supply of guns and powder and killed 150 people, many of them defenseless men, women and children. The dead included Persicles, his wife and children. Three of Bacon’s party also lost their lives in the two-day fight before the small band dragged themselves back to their homes.News of the victory was enthusiastically received in the frontier counties and the hero now became an idol. Nathaniel Bacon was soon elected one of the burgesses of Henrico County in defiance of Governor Berkeley’s proclamations. Going downriver to Jamestown to take his seat in the Assembly, Bacon wisely was accompanied by a friendly escort. Above the town, Bacon sent ahead to learn whether he would be allowed to take his seat. In reply, the Governor opened fire on the sloop from the fort’s guns. Bacon sailed back upriver to the home of Richard Lawrence, a sympathizer where he, Lawrence and a William Drummond conferred for hours. Returning to his boat, Bacon was discovered, alarms were sounded and several boats with armed men chased after Bacon’s little sloop. By about three o’clock he was driven aground by the Adam and Eve and forced to surrender. Bacon was taken to Governor Berkeley. The old man exclaimed, “Now I behold the greatest Rebell that ever was in Virginia!” He asked, “Mr. Bacon, do you continue to be a gentleman? And may I take your word? If so you are at liberty upon your parol.” Bacon was set free, not because of the Governor’s magnanimity (he had told Bacon’s wife she would see her husband hanged) but because to do otherwise could set the entire colony upon revenge. Bacon’s companions who had been arrested, however, were kept in irons. [14] Standoff Between Royalists and Rebels Members of the new Assembly—including the duly elected Nathaniel Bacon—gathered in Jamestown on June 5 and listened to Governor Berkeley pontificate about the Indian massacres. “If they had killed my grandfather and my grandmother,” he exclaimed, “my father and mother, all my friends, yet if they had come to treat of peace they ought to have gone in peace.” There was a short recess before Berkeley began again, “If there be joy in the presence of the angels over one sinner that repenteth, there is joy now, for we have a penitent sinner come before us. Call Mr. Bacon.” Bacon was then compelled to kneel in front of the burgesses and confess his offense, and to beg the pardon of God, the King and the Governor. To this, Berkeley exclaimed three times, “God forgive you, I forgive you.” Colonel Cole, a Council member, asked pointedly, “And all that were with them?” “Yea,” Governor Berkeley answered, “and all that were with him.” He then said, “Mr. Bacon, if you will live civilly but to the next quarter court, I’ll promise to restore your place there,” pointing to Bacon’s seat. In fact, Bacon’s election was immediately restored and he was promised a commission—to be delivered in three days—to go out against the Indians. [15] The commission didn’t arrive—possibly because the Assembly was confronting other matters. Governor Berkeley, believing all was quiet and that his pardon wasn’t morally binding, issued secret warrants to seize Bacon. Whether Bacon suspected hypocrisy or felt his work was done, he left Jamestown unaccompanied. His old comrades in arms welcomed him home in Henrico County, believing he was officially commissioned to defend their territory and homes. When they learned he was once more a fugitive they “sett their throats in one common key of Oathes and curses and cried aloud, that they would either have a Commission…or else they would pull downe the Towne.” [16] Rumors reached Jamestown on June 22nd that Bacon was approaching at the head of 500 very angry men. The ragtag army was made up of weatherbeaten frontiersmen, planters sunk deeply in debt, freedmen whose release from bondage brought little relief. There was no moderation and little reason in the mass of rebels. Berkeley summoned the York “train bands” to defend Jamestown against Bacon’s presumed attack. (Train bands were local militia who trained in weekly drills.) Only 100 showed up—late—and half of them were rebel sympathizers. Four guns were dragged to Sandy Bay to cover the narrow neck of land connecting the peninsula to the left bank of the river. Messengers rushed to Jamestown, advising of the ad hoc army’s approach led by Bacon. In the face of this apparently oIn the face of this apparently overwhelming threat, Governor Berkeley dismounted the guns, withdrew the soldiers and retired to the state house. Confrontation at the State House Four days later, at 2:00 in the afternoon, Bacon and his men—now numbering 600 on foot and horseback—entered the city without resistance. A file of fusiliers arrayed themselves on the green before the state house. Half an hour later, a customary drum tattoo called the Assembly to order. Two Council members demanded to know what Bacon wanted. Bacon answered that he had come for a commission as general of volunteers enrolled against the Indians, and that his men would refuse to pay levies for new forces. Angrily, Governor Berkeley signed a commission and presented it. Bacon read it to his soldiers and declared that the powers were insufficient. Bacon drew up a new paper, indicating his loyalty to the king and the legality of his past actions and appointing himself general of all the forces in Virginia used against the Indians. This threw the aged governor into a rage and he refused to sign the commission. Berkeley, dramatically baring his breast before the armed rebels, cried, “Here! Shoot me, ’fore God, fair mark. Shoot!” Bacon replied, “No, may it please your Honor, we will not hurt a hair of your head, nor of any other man’s. We are come for a commission to save our lives from the Indians, which you have so often promised, and now we will have it before we go.” Bacon strode back and forth before his men, holding his left arm akimbo, gesticulating violently with his other arm and muttering “new coyned oathes.” The Governor and Council members withdrew to his private apartment at the other end of the state house. Bacon rushed after him, his hand moving from sword hilt to his hat, followed by the fusiliers with their guns cocked. They shouted at a window, “We will have it! We will have it!” A burgess well-known to them appeared at the window, waved his handkerchief and exclaimed, “You shall have it, you shall have it!” The fusiliers uncocked their guns and lowered them as Bacon returned. It was reported that Bacon had earlier ordered his men to fire in case he drew his sword, which explained his nervous gestures. An hour later, Bacon entered the Assembly chamber and received the commission authorizing him to march against the Indians. [17] A new humiliation awaited the Governor the next day as Bacon returned to the House of Burgesses with an armed guard, demanding that certain persons obeying the Governor’s orders be removed from office and that letters to the king denouncing Bacon as a rebel be publicly contradicted. Berkeley swore he would rather be killed than submit. The Burgesses, who likely thought their throats would be cut, advised the Governor to grant Bacon whatever he wanted. Shortly, a letter was written to the king and signed by Berkeley and the Burgesses attesting to Bacon’s loyalty and justifying his actions, several Berkeley cronies were assigned to prison, blank commissions were written for officers to command under Bacon—any and everything Bacon wanted was granted “as long as they concerned not life and limb” [18] Giving in to the Rebels Berkeley’s capitulation allowed Bacon to fight the Indians wherever and whenever he desired without interference. With this, the Governor lost all claim to authority and Bacon’s Rebellion was in full force. Standing now at the head of a thousand men, Bacon marched against the Pamunkies, killing many and destroying their camps. Meanwhile, the loyal colonists in Gloucester—disarmed earlier by Governor Berkeley—petitioned for protection. Berkeley responded with animation, hurrying to the town proclaiming Bacon a rebel and a traitor. He summoned militia from throughout that county and Middlesex—some 1,200 men—proposing that they pursue Bacon and arrest him. He was greeted by shouts, “Bacon! Bacon!” They withdrew from the field, leaving the humiliated Governor to ponder the chasm separating the people and their government. Bacon, nearing the York River, heard of the situation in Gloucester. He stated that “it vexed him to the heart that while he was hunting wolves which were [presumed?] innocent lambs, the governor and those with him should pursue him in the rear with full cry, and that he was like corn between two millstones, which would grind him to powder if he didn’t look to it.” He marched back to Gloucester on July 29th. Berkeley, knowing he had been abandoned, escaped with a few friends across the Chesapeake Bay to John Custis’s house in Accomack County on the Eastern Shore—safe in knowing Bacon’s army hadn’t the boats to follow him. During this pause in the confrontation, Bacon was faced with a quandary. He could fight, knowing the terrain and new methods of unorthodox fighting would make 500 Virginians the equal of 2,000 Red Coats. He could also appeal to the Dutch or French for assistance. But the people would not openly refute their ties of blood, religion and language to their mother land of England. He had to deceive the people with a pretence of loyalty, take an oath of allegiance and demand it of his followers—even, absurdly, that it was in the crown’s interest to disobey a king’s order, arrest his governor and fight his troops. To succeed, he knew, he had to seduce the wealthy planters, and so called at least 69 influential plantation owners to his home at Middle Plantation on Aug. 3, 1676. Haranguing, wheedling and cajoling them—even locking the doors against their departure—Bacon made them sign three oaths: to assist him in fighting the Indian war, to resist all attempts of the Governor to raise troops against him, and to resist His Majesty’s troops until Bacon could bring his cause to the attention of King Charles II. This last was a contentious sticking point. [19] As “General by Consent of the People” now, Bacon issued his Declaration of the People the next day. [This classic statement of grievances is printed below.] Although this statement seems classic in foreshadowing the Declaration of Independence a century later, it must be remembered that Bacon wrote it without consulting anyone. He probably had strong support from the rank and file, since about 70 of the 600 men who rallied to the cause were black. [20] Bacon also undertook civil administration at this time. With four members of the Council, he ordered the election of a new Assembly on Sept. 4th in Jamestown. Uppermost in his mind was the fight on two fronts. His men seized the English ship lying in the James River, impressing Captain Larrimore and her crew to secure his back. This vessel, along with a sloop and a bark with four guns, were placed under the command of Captain William Carver and Gyles Bland to patrol the Western shore. Attacking on Two Fronts Bacon simultaneously turned to renew his attack against the Occaneechees and Susquehannocks. For some reason, his attention was turned to the Pamunkeys. Crossing the James to the York River, he met with Colonel Gyles Brent with reinforcements from plantations on the Potomac and Rappahannock. The small army was fired upon by the Pamunkeys, who then fled into the swamps—except for one woman and her child. They then found an elderly nurse of the Pamunkey queen, forcing her to be their guide. The wily woman, unwilling to betray her people, led them far astray. Angry at being taken miles from their quarry, he ordered the old woman knocked in the head and killed. The army then wandered randomly, following one lead and then turning to another, all the time realizing the Assembly would meet shortly in Jamestown. A tired and discouraged army begged Bacon to take them home, but he resolved that he would rather die in the woods, living on chinquapins and horse flesh, than betray the confidence placed in him. As the army split—half to remain and half to return home, Bacon’s group floundered into the main camp of the Pamunkeys. The enemy was surrounded by swamp on three sides, but fled as the English charged in. Securing his plunder and captives, Bacon and his men turned back to the plantations. [21] Disgruntled, Governor Berkeley remained at his home at Green Spring trying to ignore the problem Bacon presented. But, by September, he had regained his spirit. Captain Carver had arrived at the coast of Accomack and went ashore under a flag of truce. Bland and his men remained on board to guard the ships and Larrimore’s sailors. Larrimore somehow managed to get a message to the Governor, urgently requesting rescuers. Berkeley dithered; was it a trap? Desperate, he liberally “caressed Carver with wine” to delay him while 26 men under Colonel Philip Ludwell sneaked out to Larrimore in two small boats. Ludwell’s men entered Larrimore’s boat through an open gun port. One soldier put a pistol to Bland’s heart, saying “You are my prisoner.” The rest of the company followed, while Captain Larrimore and his crew grabbed spikes to help. The rebels surrendered immediately. Carver returned unsuspecting, was immediately tried for treason, condemned and hanged. [22] Seizing the moment as a turning point, Berkeley felt strong enough to retake Jamestown and fortify it. The Indian fighting continued and Bacon was nowhere in sight as the date of the Assembly approached. Bacon’s friends had left Jamestown and it was occupied now by the governor’s sympathizers. Berkeley arrived on Sept. 7 on Captain Larrimore’s ship, with the Adam and Eve and 16 or 17 sloops. Colonel Lawrence’s house was seized the next morning, “with all his wealth and a faire cupboard of plate standing, which fell into the Governor’s hands.” He and his army, crossing the James River at his own house at Curles, surprised a band of Appomattox Indians who lived on both sides of the river. The militia killed a large number of people, scattered the rest and burned the village. Moving southward, he then destroyed tribal towns on the banks of the Nottoway, Meherrin and Roanoke. Indians fled in advance, often without food. Having exhausted their own provisions, Bacon dismissed a large part of his forces. At this point, he learned of the governor’s return to Jamestown. Infuriated, Bacon collected a force—estimated variously as 150, 300 or 800—from New Kent and Henrico, informed them of the situation and quickly marched them and the Indian captives to Jamestown. Attack on the Capital City Jamestown had been fortified with a “palisade ten paces in width, running across the neck of the peninsula” and defended with three large guns. The ships had been laid broadside, bringing their guns to bear on the probable attack. In town, the forces numbered a thousand men—three times the force Bacon could bring. Jamestown contained a church and some 16 or 18 brick houses. The population had been reduced to about a dozen families. Within the besieged town, the Governor hoped Bacon’s troops would run out of food and force the rebels to retire from the field. For his part, Berkeley had supplied his troops from his home three miles distant. In this tense standoff, Bacon executed an unthinkable and ungentlemanly tactic. Small parties of cavalry captured the wives of several loyalists. His captives included the wife of his cousin Colonel Nathaniel Bacon, Sr., Madame Bray, Madame Page and Madame Ballard. He singled out one lady to return to town with the warning that the women would be put on the ramparts as shields if the governor attacked. An outraged Colonel Philip Ludwell fulminated that the rebels were “ravishing the women from their homes, and hurrying them about the country in their rude camps, often threatening them with death.” More probably, Bacon used the shield tactic only as a threat. He was busy having his men build earthworks around the Governor’s fortification. On Sept. 16th, a lookout standing on a rooftop announced the rebels were going attack. Six or seven hundred English troops were ordered to storm Bacon’s redoubt—but many were there by compulsion with no heart for fighting. General Bacon rode along his hastily constructed breastwork, reconnoitering the Governor’s position. Dismounting, he addressed his men to advance, had a trumpet sound the attack and ordered them to fire. With the first volleys from the rebels, the English turned and fled. They marched out “like scholars going to school,” reported one chronicler, “but returned with light heels.” The mortal losses were small—12 men were killed in the attack—but the English humiliation was incalculable. It was reported, “Soe great was the Cowardize and Baseness of the generality of Sir William Berkeley’s party that there were only some 20 Gentlemen willing to stand by him.” The captive ladies went back on top of the earthworks in view of their husbands and friends in town. [23] The Governor, realizing the enormity of his defeat, stole away in the night with his sympathizers after nailing up the guns and leaving the houses empty. Bacon stormed Jamestown on Sept. 19th. At this moment, news came that Bacon’s former ally Colonel Brent had collected troops in the counties bordering the Potomac and would march with a thousand men to assist Berkeley. If this happened, and supported by the fleet, Bacon would be cut off in Jamestown. In his anger, he determined to burn Jamestown, saying there would be no more sanctuary there. His leaders agreed. Richard Lawrence and William Drummond, who owned two of the best houses, each set fire to their own homes as examples. The soldiers fired the rest of the community, including the church and statehouse. [24] Bacon’s forces marched to the York River, crossing at Tindall’s Point (Gloucester) to confront Colonel Brent. Many of the Virginia soldiers, sympathizing with Bacon’s success, deserted the army. Bacon stopped and set up a headquarters at Colonel Augustine Warner II’s homestead where he called a convention in Gloucester. (Warner, a member of the House of Burgesses, was a loyalist and may have been agitated by the visitors.) Here he administered his oath of allegiance to the people of the county and began planning another expedition—either against the Indians or the Governor’s troops in Accomack. Beginning of the End The influential plantation owners were now withdrawing their support—even drawing to the Governor’s side. Further, the king’s troops would shortly arrive in Virginia. With no navy and no army, Bacon was doomed. In the midst of this planning, Nathaniel Bacon fell ill with dysentery and retired to the house of a Dr. Pate in Gloucester County. The loathsome disease was called the “bloodie flux” and “lousey disease” (body lice). Delirious in the following days, he often cried out, asking if the guard around the house was strong or if the king’s troops had arrived. The debacle of anarchism—or popular heroism?—came to an abrupt end on Oct. 26. Bacon was dead at age 29. His body was disposed of and never found. It’s possible that the contaminated corpse was burned by soldiers—or that they hid it so his remains wouldn’t be desecrated. His death, however, was remembered by the doggerel, “Bacon is Dead I am sorry at my hart That lice and flux should take the hangman’s part.” He was succeeded—for a very short while—by his Lieutenant General Joseph Ingram. Ingram has been called a man of low birth, a dandy and a fool even though he showed military skill against the Governor. In any case, it is doubtful any rebel army could have held out against English Red Coats and sea power. [25] Hearing of Bacon’s death, Governor Berkeley returned to reclaim his government. He had sent to England for more troops, which set sail Nov. 24, 1676. The remainder of the fleet left on Dec. 8 and 9. The Bristol, under Admiral Sir John Berry and Francis Moryson, sailed up the James River Jan. 29, 1677, with the other forces arriving between Feb 1 and 14. Governor Berkeley used these forces in exacting revenge. Among his first acts was to hang leaders of the rebellion—some 23 men. He seized rebel property without benefit of trial. Finally, an outraged Assembly insisted that the executions and reprisals stop. Berkeley’s excessive reprisals were not greeted pleasurably in England. An investigating committee there reported to King Charles II. Berkeley was relieved of his Council seat and recalled to England. He sailed for the mother country on Apr. 20. In August, Berkeley died in England without ever having seen the king. [26] This ended one of the strangest chapters of colonial American history. Latter-day interpretations call Bacon’s Rebellion the first cry of independence against British authority. Certainly, Virginia’s laws weren’t effective in dealing with economic or civil problems. At its heart, however, the rebellion may best be called a power struggle between two very strong personalities that resulted in the destruction of Jamestown and the death of hundreds of colonial rebels, Indians, military forces and colonists.
sources
MilitaryHistoryOnline.com

The Success of Napoleon

The Success of Napoleon by Richard Podruchny
window.google_render_ad();
On the European continent, no one would have imagined that the rise of the "Little Corsican" would have perpetuated a conquest that would involve the entire European continent. This article will take a look at how and why Napoleon Bonaparte was as successful on the battlefield as he was. We will also see how Napoleon efficiently utilized the weapons and technology on hand that would formulate his strategy and tactics, which would result in his domination of Western Europe. To begin looking at how Napoleon came to dominate Western Europe, we will start with what was inherited from his predecessors. Overall, the technology during the Napoleonic era was relatively unchanged. For the infantry, their small arms, such as the musket and bayonet changed very little.[1] The artillery arm, however, went through some major renovations prior to Napoleon's rise to power. Under the direction of Inspector General Jean-Baptiste Varvette de Gribeauval, these innovations have been described as the foundation of the military achievements of Revolutionary and Napoleonic France.[2] The innovations that Gribeauval implemented were that artillery pieces were now made with interchangeable parts, which was suitable for mass production; gun carriages were built to a standard model; the mobility of the guns was improved by harnessing the horses in pairs instead of in file; hardwood axles replaced heavy iron ones; and accuracy was improved through the introduction of the "tangent sight," which is a graduated brass measure that enabled the gunner to sight the gun on a target. The greater mobility of the artillery would be one of the most defining improvements, since it would make it possible for the guns to accompany divisions.[3] Through these relatively small number of improvements, Napoleon essentially mastered Europe with the weapons and equipment that was available. This means that Napoleon simply made more efficient use with what was on hand. As was mentioned previously, Napoleon improved upon the potential of division formations. Napoleon essentially borrowed the divisional formation from Count Jacques de Guibert, who was the author of his Essai General de Tactique and Defense du Systeme de Guerre.[4] He stressed the need for greater mobility and advocated the use of divisional formations. It was through the use of divisional formations that Napoleon revolutionized strategy. Armies would now be composed of detachable parts that could engage the enemy alone until the rest of the army came up in support, which consisted of both infantry and artillery.[5] Divisions could also be used in encircling or flanking movements, while on the defensive, the division could be used to prevent these offensive maneuvers. This type of formation can now take the advantage of parallel roads and be able to concentrate immediately before making contact with the enemy. As a result of implementing divisional formations, generalship was made more complicated and staff work became more important, as well as the need for highly detailed maps that would need to show terrain features and road networks. It was through this type of generalship that Napoleon would demonstrate his genius, since he was essentially his own chief of staff and he was able to effectively direct operations of his armies, where others would have failed.[6] Even though Napoleon had implemented the use of divisional formations, armies during this time period would drastically increase in size due to conscription. These conscription based armed forces in France would number over a half a million men.[7] In order to effectively command these large numbers of troops, Napoleon would implement permanent army corps within the French army. This organizational unit became essential for administration and command and controlling these large numbers of troops. The corps formation would be utilized similarly as the division, which it would be a combined arms organization composed of infantry, artillery and cavalry. The cavalry would be responsible for conducting reconnaissance for the entire corps and would also have its own divisional organization within the corps. Even though the corps made it easier for Napoleon to direct his forces, the division would still remain as the major tactical unit within the French army.[8] As mentioned previously, conscription became the reason for such a drastic increase in the number of troops. However, conscription came about from the French Revolution, which is where a new type of army emerged. In this new type of army, the aristocratic monopoly on officer commissions was removed, which paved the way for a new kind of officer. These new officers were the former Non-Commissioned Officers of the old royal army and they quickly transformed into a competent professional officer corps. Now that the aristocracy no longer had their monopoly, these officers, especially engineering and artillery officers, needed some knowledge of math and science, which led to giving these officers some type of formal education that led to the development of military academies. Another result of the French Revolution would be the emergence of the "nation-in-arms." The French army was not only moved by discipline but through ideological and patriotic dedication. The French government and citizens would support this new national army through the nationalized manufacturing of war material. This increased industrial production, even though this was before the full extent of the Industrial Revolution had reached the European continent, would largely be accomplished by hand rather than machine in order to support that vast numbers of troops that France and Napoleon would rely on.[9] Now that we have seen what Napoleon had inherited through some of the technological and organizational innovations, as well as through the fruits of the French Revolution, we can now take a look at how Napoleon utilized these resources on the field of battle. By taking a top-down approach, we will first examine the strategic concepts that were refined and employed by Napoleon. At this level of warfare, the strategic level is where Napoleon would excel. To make effective use of his army's superior mobility and inspiration, Napoleon developed two major strategic systems. When he was facing an enemy superior in numbers, the strategy of the central position was used in order to split the enemy into separate parts.[10] This was where each could be eliminated in detail through maneuvering in order to gain the French a local superiority of force in successive actions by bringing the reserve into action at the critical time and place. On the other hand, of the French held superiority in numbers, Napoleon would often use a maneuver of envelopment.[11] By using this tactic, Napoleon would capture his foe's attention with a detachment of his army, while the bulk of his army would sweep against the enemy's lines of communication in order to sever the enemy's links with his bases.[12] Through these two types of strategy, Napoleon would once again borrow these ideas from one of his teachers. Pierre de Bourcet, a chief of staff of the royal armies in both the War of the Austrian Succession and the Seven Years War, as well as the director of the school for staff officers at Grenoble. He taught that an enemy could be misled by moves of various units which appeared to be disconnected, but which were actually part of a unified plan. The overall aim of this strategy was to compel the enemy to divide their forces and then to attack them while separated before it could be reinforced. It was through this philosophy that would form the basis of Napoleonic strategy. Napoleon would later refine this strategy by accident at the Battle of Marengo in 1800, where the battle was won for Napoleon by the opportune appearance of a division that had failed to concentrate prior to battle. Thereafter, Napoleon would often hold reserves back until the enemy forces were worn out, which was when he would send in his reserves.[13] By employing these two types of strategies, Napoleon always looked to ways that would draw his enemy out to battle. He saw battle as a means to destroying his enemy's means of resistance. Napoleon's first and clearly defined objective at the outset of any of his campaign was the enemy's army, which he intended to destroy.[14] If his enemy did not want to risk battle, he would force them to do battle through his maneuvering, which would threaten something vital. Throughout all of his campaigns, Napoleon always sought to seize and retain the initiative, in order to impose his will upon the enemy. Even when Napoleon was badly outnumbered, he was still able to outmaneuver his enemies through marching and maneuvering, in order to employ the bulk of his forces at a weakened point of the enemy's. It was through Napoleon's focus on the enemy's armed forces and his ability to exercise quick maneuvering that he would enjoy most of his successes.[15] The quick maneuvering and marching ability of Napoleon's armies would form the foundation in the execution of Napoleon's strategic concepts. When the French Revolution broke out, the French military logistical system rapidly fell apart, which proved incapable of providing the logistical support required by the newly raised French armies. This would evolve into the French army being able to operate by living off the land and not having to depend upon the magazine supply system. By living off the land, this would lead to the mystique that the French army could outmarch every other army in Europe. The French army was not handicapped by large numbers of supply wagons, which also fed this mystique. Instead of the army being hampered with how fast or how slow their supply train can move, now they were able to march as fast as their soldier's legs could carry them.[16] To aid in Napoleon's speed of maneuver, his troops traveled light. Coupled with the increase in mobility from living off the land, the French abandoned the orthodox 70 paces per minute line of march in favor of a quick step of 120 paces per minute. This simple change would allow the French to march twenty to thirty kilometers per day. Even though this may seem to be a simplistic change, but in the days prior to railroads or automobiles, this change was a dramatic one. However, any army could duplicate France's new doctrine, but it was the revolutionary ideals of the citizen army and the threat to the survival of their "New France," as well as the sense of French nationalism that inspired the French army to perform such feats that were impossible for other armies to achieve during this time period.[17] Now that we have seen how Napoleon was able to dominate the strategic arena on the European continent through strategic refinements, adopted changes in doctrine and the revamping of the logistical supply system, we can now look at the modifications and innovations that Napoleon made at the tactical level of warfare. At the tactical level, we will first examine the foundation of Napoleon's army, the infantry arm. As a member of the French infantry, an individual could expect two to three weeks of basic training, which stressed the use of the bayonet. The Napoleonic foot soldiers were renowned for their agility, stubborn attacks, as well as the speed of their marches. As it was mentioned previously, it was this speed and maneuverability that formed the foundation of Napoleon's successful campaigns. This speed and maneuverability was due to the lack of baggage that was carried by the French foot soldier, since they bivouacked in the open and lived off the land.[18] Now that the French infantry was not weighed down with excess baggage, the re-introduction of light-infantry was put into practice. The use of skirmishing tactics and skirmishers in the era of the French Revolution meant that the foot soldier had to be re-trained to operate as an individual, as well as a part of a group. Napoleon would often utilize the light infantry or skirmishers to probe enemy positions or to find and keep the enemy stationary until the light artillery and larger infantry formations moved in support.[19] With the re-introduction of light infantry into the Napoleonic army, they would be combined with a close order column, which would constitute the new tactics of the Napoleonic infantry. The light infantry or skirmishers would occupy the enemy in order for the larger assault formations to move up without being too exposed to the fire of the enemy line. To put this into a clearer perspective, the Napoleonic regular infantry would perform either role, whether it was in a skirmishing or regular infantry role. Now the roles of the Napoleonic foot soldier has been identified, we can now examine the more renown infantry formations that Napoleon would utilize in his battlefield successes. One such formation was the column, which was developed by Lazare Carnot and later perfected by Napoleon. The French infantry column was an adaptation of the linear system, where the deployment of a number of linear units or battalions were in depth to provide physical and psychological weight to an attack, however, individual units could still operate in a linear formation. The greatest advantage by using this type of formation would rest in its flexibility and versatility. This formation would permit the commander to move large numbers of troops over the battlefield with better control and more rapidly than was possible before. The column formation could operate with ease in rough terrain, while being able to change formations just as easily. With the re-introduction of skirmishers, they could be detached without making major readjustments on the battlefield. While on the battlefield, this formation could very rapidly convert from two or three rank firing lines or squares and back to the original formation.[20] Overall, the French infantry column essentially had two main functions; first, it could be used to bring troops in close order rapidly to engage the enemy; second, it could be used as a sustaining force. If the column sent out skirmishers to start the engagement, it would be used as a replacement pool for the skirmishers, as well as their immediate tactical reserve. If the column encountered firm resistance, the column might deploy into lines to carry on the fight with volleys. Once the enemy wavered, these lines could resume the advance or they might reduce their front and move forward in column.[21] With the improvements in tactics and employment of the infantry arm, Napoleon would also make great use of his cavalry and not just in battle. The French cavalry would serve as the basis for Napoleon's intelligence collection. His light cavalry would be sent out well ahead of his army's main body in their attempt to find the enemy and be able to ascertain their dispositions.[22] On the battlefield, the cavalry would remain as the shock arm of the Napoleonic army, with lances and sabers as their principle weapons. Within Napoleon's cavalry arm, he would still keep the distinctions between light and heavy cavalry. Now with Napoleon providing his cavalry with artillery and still utilizing them in great numbers, he would use them in surprise operations against the enemy's cavalry and infantry, which would prove to be very effective. The Napoleonic cavalry would typically be used against the enemy's infantry that had already been shaken or broken by massive artillery bombardment or by infantry attacks. Napoleon would demonstrate just how effective he could use his cavalry on the retreating enemy, which would cause as much chaos and destruction upon his enemies as possible. As Napoleon would later find out, the use of his cavalry against fresh infantry formations that would have the time to form squares would often prove disastrous for the attacking cavalry.[23] After looking at how the Napoleonic infantry and cavalry underwent their renovations during the Napoleonic era, we can now focus upon Napoleon's favored arm, the artillery. By the time that France was plunged into its revolution, its army's artillery had been brought up to the latest standards, as well as its many new gunners and officers being trained in their employment. The French artillery arm would owe its change in status to Jean Baptiste Gribeauval, who would standardize all construction and design of the artillery pieces and gun carriages. This led to lighter, more manageable cannon, better quality barrels and ammunition. After 1800, the French artillery service would also benefit from the fact that their new Commander-in-Chief, Napoleon, was one of these very same artillery officers who had exerted so much influence on revolutionary fighting. Combined with the sweeping technological and organizational changes that were begun before the revolution, this would assure that the French artillery arm was the state-of-the-art for its time. These improvements would boost morale in a branch of service which already had a long tradition of professionalism. The end result was more aggressive battlefield tactics and ensuing success, which ushered artillery away from a supporting position into a decisive and highly destructive role.[24] The use of artillery by Napoleon would once again be traced back and perfected during this era. Even though Napoleon believed that while the infantry was the main arm of an army and it could not stand up to superior artillery, he would borrow his ideals in employing artillery from Chevalier du Teil, who was Napoleon's superior in command of artillery at Toulon, where he had urged that artillery be concentrated at the point of attack and dispersed along the entire line. Napoleon would follow this practice and he would use his large caliber guns to blast a hole in the enemy's line into which the infantry could penetrate. As time went on, and the quality of French conscripts deteriorated, Napoleon would increase the proportion of artillery in his armies and he would rely more and more on bombardment.[25] Due to the lower quality of conscripts, one of Napoleon's favorite battlefield techniques was through the use of the Grande Batterie. The Grande Batterie would be used in the later years during the Napoleonic era. This technique was essentially the physical massing of artillery fire in support of achieving his main objective on the battlefield, which would have the effect of blasting the enemy line to shreds to permit his infantry to advance. Even though Napoleon had raised the artillery branch from the status of an auxiliary to that of an equal compared to the infantry and cavalry branches, his use of artillery would still remain a contributing factor to his successes, however a very potent one.[26] During the era of Napoleon, no one was able to match his ability to perfect the use of weapons, technology and tactics as he did. As we have seen, Napoleon was not so much the innovator but the borrower, which provided the foundation for his string of successes on the European continent. The impact that Napoleon would have can be found through his losses. In his defeats, this is where we can see how his enemies adapted to Napoleon's war making capabilities. Overall, the impact on the European continent would be through the emergence of the "nation-in-arms," which demonstrated the ability to field masses of troops and dramatically increased production efforts with a nation behind the war effort. It would be the combination of Napoleon's war reforms and the French nation behind his forces in the field that would have the greatest resounding impact on Europe.
sources
MilitaryHistoryOnline.com

The "Green Beret Affair": A Brief Introduction

By the year 1969 United States involvement in South Vietnam was in its fourth year with no end in sight. Major U.S. ground combat forces, to include elite paratroops and marines, had been first committed in country during the spring of 1965. The fighting had increased in scale and intensity until by 1969 U.S. military strength stood at 536,000 on the ground. The Navy's 7th Fleet in the Tonkin Gulf, and Air Force strategic bombers flying from bases on Guam and Thailand provided major sea and air support for US forces on the ground. The South East Asia Treaty Organization nations of Australia, New Zealand, South Korea, Thailand and the Philippines would provide yet another 62,000 allied troops fighting against the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese Communist forces.[1] The Vietnam War, and peace talks in Paris, continued to drag on in 1969 with little end in sight. The year of 1969 would also see one of the most interesting, controversial, and little understood events of the Vietnam War, the "Green Beret Affair." This affair, involving the identification and execution of a Communist Viet Cong double or triple agent by U.S. Army Special Forces working with the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), is an illustrative example of the morally ambiguous nature of modern day unconventional warfare. Such issues are still being faced by our Special Operations Forces in the current Global War on Terror (GWOT). I will attempt in this article to examine the "Green Beret Affair" from 1969 and outline how similar issues are faced daily by our forces around the globe. In many respects the war in Southeast Asia was tailor made for the newest and most controversial force in the U.S. Army, the Special Forces (SF). Special Forces would be popularly know as the "Green Berets," much to the chagrin of the troopers themselves, who were quick to point out to outsiders that they were not a headgear but a highly trained and capable force of professionals. The beret itself, jungle green in color, was not that important or functional but was a highly emotional symbol, at least to the stiff necked conventional Army, of the attitude of the man who wore it; unconventional, more concerned with substance over form, and quite willing to defy conventions in order to accomplish a mission. The troops themselves were fascinating, a unique organization that attracted square pegs that often would not fit into the round holes of the spit and polish Conventional Army. Ranks were full of colorful nonconformists and extremely dedicated soldiers such as the Eastern European Lodge Act enlistees who volunteered for service in the American army and SF in the hopes of returning to their homeland with a victorious force. SF was probably the closest organization to the French Foreign Legion that the American Army had, and made many uncomfortable. Their willingness to defy convention, and discipline at times, would prove troublesome to many in the Army. Many generals could not hide their open disdain for Special Forces, with one Army Chief of Staff in the 1960's describing SF troops as "refugees from responsibility" and that they "tended to be nonconformists, couldn't quite get along in a straight military system…"[2] Note: this nonconformist trend has continued to the present day, the author is proud to report. Organized into small 12 man teams with specialists in weapons, engineering, demolitions, medicine, communications, operations and intelligence, the Special Forces Operational Detachment Alpha, SFODA, or A Team, was, and is, a compact, highly trained small unit capable of building, healing and destroying. The Special Forces Operational Detachment Bravo, SFODB, or B Team, provided command and control for 6 A Teams and operated as the Company Headquarters. B Detachments in Vietnam would additionally run special projects or missions, often involving intelligence collection and reporting. SF soldiers were capable of operating independently behind enemy lines with little outside support and could train, organize and lead resistance forces against occupying powers. Unconventional warfare (UW), as a mission, would be the "bread and butter" for SF. Defined as a broad spectrum of military and paramilitary operations, unconventional warfare are normally of long duration, predominately conducted through, with, or by indigenous or surrogate forces that are organized, trained, equipped, supported and directed by an external source. UW includes guerrilla warfare, subversion, sabotage, intelligence activities and unconventional assisted recovery.[3] The troops adopted the Trojan horse from classical history as their distinctive unit insignia and the Latin phrase De Oppresso Liber, "To Liberate from Oppression," as their SF motto. President John F. Kennedy would visit the Special Warfare Center at Fort Bragg for an orientation on Special Forces by then Brigadier General William P. Yarborough, wearing an unauthorized headgear, the Green Beret. Much to the chagrin of the Army and Department of Defense, JFK would come away so impressed with Special Forces that he would shortly authorize the wear of the controversial beret and call it "a symbol of excellence, a badge of courage, a mark of distinction in the fight for freedom."[4] Army Special Forces would forever be linked to JFK; members of SF served in the honor guard at his funeral in November of 1963, with one of the soldiers spontaneously placing his beret on the grave at the end of the ceremony as a mark of respect. President Kennedy's legacy would be further remembered when the Special Warfare Center and School at Fort Bragg, NC would be named the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School.[5] The Special Forces in the Sixties would go through a period where they captured the public's imagination, beginning with the best selling book The Green Berets by Robin Moore in 1966. The paperback book became a best seller, followed by the surprise hit song Ballad of the Green Berets, by Staff Sergeant Barry Sadler, an SF soldier who had served in Vietnam and received the Purple Heart for wounds, which would ultimately become the number 1 single record in the US for 1966. GI Joes, bubble gum cards, comic books, and Mattel toys would all celebrate Army Special Forces during the craze. Finally, the ultimate honor would be accorded the force in 1968 when John Wayne would produce and star in the action film The Green Berets, with David Janssen and Jim Hutton.[6] The strongly anti-communist, and pro-South Vietnam film, was a labor of love by Mr. Wayne, a stanch supporter of the war, who was openly disgusted by the anti-war protest movement in the United States at the time. All of this would have a profound effect on many American youths coming of age, to include the author, who can remember receiving a miniature Green Beret one year as a Christmas present during that timeframe, a foretaste of things to come years later. Army Special Forces was born in 1952, the brainchild of World War II Office of Strategic Service (OSS), and Philippine Island Guerrilla veterans. These veterans, such as Colonels Russ Volkman, Aaron Bank and Wendell Fertig, had come out of the Second World War convinced of the effectiveness of unconventional warfare in an era of "pushbutton" warfare and atomic weapons. They had seen, first hand, the effectiveness of unconventional warfare against heavy handed occupying powers such as Nazi Germany or Imperial Japan. To use an example from both major theatres of war, accepted figures are that ultimately upwards to 200,000 were involved in the resistance in occupied France and some 250,000 fighting in the Philippines after Japanese occupation in 1942.[7] It is difficult to quantify exactly how effective the pro-Allied resistance movements were in Europe and Asia but General Eisenhower is said to have said that the forces of the resistance in Europe had done the work of some 15 divisions, and had shortened the Second World War by two months.[8] The Army was not particularly keen upon the unconventional warfare concept in general but saw the utility of using a group of misfits and foreigners in Europe against the expected Soviet led blitzkrieg from the east. Thus, the 10th Special Forces Group (Airborne) (10th SFGA) was formed in 1952 under the command of Colonel Aaron Bank, an OSS/SOE veteran and shipped to West Germany. The expected onslaught never occurred from the Soviets but SF trained hard throughout Europe and soon proved its worth to the Big Army. Additional SF forces were formed, to include the 77th SFGA at Fort Bragg in North Carolina and 1st SFGA in Japan. New roles and missions, in addition to UW and the familiar one of training potential guerrillas against expected communist invasions, emerged. One of these new missions included assisting friendly governments in the Foreign Internal Defense (FID) mode, mainly training allied armies to resist insurgencies. The gauntlet had been flung by Soviet premier Nikita Khrushchev in 1961 who would pledge support for "wars of national liberation" throughout the world, a communist challenge to the free world that would not go unanswered.[9] SF would soon be one of the instruments of choice throughout the 1960's in resisting these "wars of national liberation." After the departure of the French from the states of Indochina, Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia, in the wake of the disastrous defeat at Dien Bien Phu in 1954, a power vacuum existed in Southeast Asia. All French troops and trainers left the area leaving behind weak governments and armies attempting to combat unrest and communist led insurgencies. A limited program of assistance was begun by the US Government in support of these pro-western governments to include economic and military assistance. Enter institutions such as the CIA and SF. In 1956 Army Special Forces Detachments would be stood up in Japan and soon began training allied armies in Taiwan, Thailand and South Vietnam. In South Vietnam, SF teams, working with the CIA, was soon training indigenous cadres in unconventional warfare and long range Ranger type operations. It is interesting to note that the first SF soldier, CPT Harry Cramer, was killed in 1957 near Nha Trang, a foreshadowing of sacrifices to come. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and Special Forces were joined at the hip in Vietnam, both working and relying upon each other for better or worse. Both institutions were probably more similar than each wanted to admit as they represented the beau ideal of a Kennedy inspired muscular response to the Communist led challenge of the "Wars of National Liberation." Roles and missions for the CIA and SF would overlap and conflict at times, causing friction inherent in war. Both were involved in various counterinsurgency programs to include collecting intelligence on the communist enemy and training and advising our South Vietnamese allies. For SF the war in Vietnam would include various highly classified programs to include cross border operations into Laos and Cambodia; in addition to gathering intelligence and running agent networks in support of operations. Since the Bay of Pigs disaster in 1961, the CIA, or Agency, as many then and now refer to it, had moved away from such large scale military and paramilitary type operations to concentrate upon more traditional activities to include intelligence collection and analysis. The agency had been deeply involved in Southeast Asia just as long as Special Forces. Many of there intelligence oriented programs, with an appropriate code name, in South Vietnam would involve both the CIA and SF. The Phoenix program was one of these intelligence programs. The Phoenix program was born of the desperate need to identify and eliminate Communist Viet Cong infrastructure hidden deep within the South Vietnamese civilian population. The communist insurgency in the south was organized along classic Maoist cellular lines, with covert units responsible for everything from logistics and procurement to guerrillas and secret police. Phoenix, using Vietnamese agents "run," or controlled by Americans, quickly achieved results but became know as an infamous terror and assassination program. In each of the 44 provinces of South Vietnam CIA run interrogation centers were established to process suspects. And process they did as the numbers rolled in, 17,000 asking for amnesty, 28,000 captured, and 20,000 killed in action. Saigon and Washington were heartened by such numbers but others were not so sanguine. A State Department official who was an advisor to the South Vietnamese stated that "It was a unilateral American program, never recognized by the South Vietnamese government. CIA representatives recruited, organized, supplied and directly paid counter terror teams, whose function was to use Viet Cong techniques of terror—assassination, abuses, kidnappings and intimidation—against the Viet Cong leadership."[10] The numbers were impressive; however, one analyst would claim "They assassinated a lot of the wrong damn people."[11] Excesses were definitely committed and old scores settled as less than trustworthy informants pursued individual vendettas. All true, but one must remember that the individuals involved in intelligence and unconventional warfare often deal with unsavory characters. Eventually William Colby, CIA official in charge of all activities in Asia, himself an old OSS veteran of World War II, had to issue a reminder to all that torture and assassination were not part and parcel of the Phoenix program. Additionally he informed all involved with the program that if individuals found the Phoenix program so distasteful on moral grounds, due to the excesses committed by our allies, they could be immediately reassigned with no harm to their subsequent careers.[12] Soldiers to include Special Forces would not be given such an opportunity for reassignment. They would continue, then as now, to be bound by the laws of war and military justice system, no matter how imperfect. To the uninformed the concept of rules and regulations limiting warfare may seem strange; after all, is it not true that "all's fair in love and war," to use a somewhat hackney phrase. The laws of war, again, which all military personnel are bound by, tolerate no such grey areas as the Phoenix program or targeted assassinations, at least in theory. Attempts to modify or regulate behavior in warfare are as old as war itself, with numerous examples going back almost to the dawn of time. Alexander the Great, in 335 B.C., is said to have informed his troops before assaulting a besieged town that "Do not destroy today what will be yours tomorrow," a clear attempt to moderate the looting of a city after it had fallen, acceptable behavior in warfare during the classical period.[13] Plato, in the Republic, writing on war, attempted to establish the principle of burial for the dead and prohibition on despoiling the dead, after the heated fury of battle had passed. Later, in the Middle Ages, additional rules limiting warfare became established practice, at least in Europe, due to the efforts of the Roman Catholic Church. Restrictions on targets began to be codified, to include prohibiting the attacking of churches, religious buildings and priests or nuns by armies. In modern language, these were protected places or forbidden targets. Additionally the concept of non-combatants began to be understood with the sick, old, women and children no longer considered worthy opponents. Other influences toward moderating wartime behavior would include the formation of the International Committee of the Red Cross in Switzerland in 1863 by Henri Dunant, and international agreements in the 20th century designed to control the impact of war both on participants and bystanders. The Hague Convention Number 4 of 1907 and the Four Geneva Conventions of 1949 would establish beyond a doubt the law of war.[14] Purposes of the law of war would be many but would mainly exist for three purposes; one, to protect both combatants and noncombatants from unnecessary suffering; two, to safeguard fundamental human rights of persons who fall into the hands of the enemy, particularly prisoners of war, the wounded and sick, and civilians not involved in the hostilities, and finally, to facilitate the restoration of peace. However, the communist nations of our globe would claim not to be bound by any such laws of war, and would infamously mistreat any prisoners who fell into their hands as "war criminals."[15] American soldiers, to include the Special Forces, would continue to be bound by such laws of war, even in the unconventional war going on in Vietnam. All U.S. Army Special Forces, in 1969, operated under the control of 5th Special Forces Group, headquartered at Nha Trang, on the southeast coast of South Vietnam. Colonel Robert B. "Bob" Rheault took command of 5th SFGA in Vietnam in May of 1969. Colonel Rheault was a 1946 graduate of the US Military Academy, who had missed the Second World War but would go on to win the Silver Star, our nation's third highest combat decoration fighting in Korea. Rheault was a unique officer in a unique force; additionally he was independently wealthy, coming from an old Boston family. He spoke French without a flaw, would be educated at Phillips Exeter Academy, West Point, and finally the University of Paris for a masters degree in international relations. No stranger to Special Forces, his initial tour was with the 10th SFGA in Germany during the late 1950's. Colonel Rheault would attend the SF Qualification course, the "Q" course, in 1961, and would command the 1st SFGA on Okinawa before being assigned to Vietnam to take command of the 5th SFGA. It would probably be no exaggeration to say Rheult was one of the most respected and beloved officers ever in SF, a "must promote" to General Officer rank if his command, and career, had not been ended prematurely by the Green Beret affair.[16] In 1969, Special Forces Detachments or A Teams were placed throughout the country in 80 or so isolated camps. The A Teams were the "point of the spear" working, living, advising, fighting and dieing with the locals. SF was uniquely positioned to gather and report intelligence. The Military Assistance Advisory Command Intelligence Officer, or J-2, at one point during the war estimated that some 50% or so of all intelligence gathered daily was from SF and its sources. Some camps had such a level of knowledge that they were able to successfully identify Viet Cong, by name, operating in their area, and then quietly go about eliminating same. In order to accomplish its intelligence gathering mission in Vietnam, a number of intelligence oriented special missions would be established and given code names, similar to the Phoenix program. One of these intelligence programs established by 5th SFGA in country was Project GAMMA, a unilateral, covert intelligence collection operation targeted against North Vietnamese Army and Viet Cong base camps in Cambodia, to include the weak Cambodian government's aiding and abetting of the communists. In February of 1968 SF Detachment B-57 was transferred from Saigon to Nha Trang and officially designated as Project GAMMA headquarters, with responsibility for managing the entire program. The program itself had potential very serious international repercussions due to the then secret B-52 strategic bombing missions being flown at the time against those communist base camps across the border in Cambodia. If the classified program was discovered, political repercussions in the U.S. and elsewhere would be most serious, given the poisonous political atmosphere of the day.[17] Personnel working on Project GAMMA were given cover as civil affairs, CA, and psychological operations, PSYOPS, officers augmenting A Teams near the Cambodian border. Five collection teams were authorized and soon had some 13 nets established with 98 codename agents providing intelligence of some manner. In October of 1968 the top intelligence officer in Vietnam on General Abrams staff estimated that Project GAMMA was providing 65 per cent of the information known on North Vietnamese Army (NVA) strength and locations in Cambodia, and some 75 per cent of the same information known on NVA within South Vietnam. The Special Forces in Vietnam, and Detachment B-57 led by Major David Crew, had developed into arguably the most productive intelligence collection project the U.S. had throughout Southeast Asia.[18] It has been said that the reason that Project GAMMA was so successful was due to the fact that the South Vietnamese had been not "read on" to the program. As a successful 1968 turned into 1969 for Project GAMMA, it was noticed by Detachment B-57 that many extremely valuable intelligence nets and agents had began to disappear, and many feared the worse, that the highly classified operation had been compromised by a double agent. The S-3 or Operations Officer, Captain Budge Williams, for the project felt that Project GAMMA was in danger of going under from an unseen and unknown communist spy. Other intelligence and counter-intelligence officers, to include Captain Leland Brumley, Major Thomas Middleton, and Chief Warrant Officer Edward Boyle became convinced also there was a security leak somewhere in the organization. All began investigations but made little headway until the spring of 1969, but did discover the unpleasant truth that some of the South Vietnamese SF working for US forces were involved in selling weapons and medical supplies to the communists. Then, ironically enough, an SF reconnaissance team, in a classified area across the border where US troops officially did not operate, discovered documents and a roll of film in a communist base camp. When the film was developed one of the Viet Cong pictures on the roll was believed to be that of Project GAMMA Vietnamese agent Thai Khac Chuyen.[19] The leak has been discovered, or had it? After conferring with the Agency, the SF soldiers involved in the investigate were told that the best way of handling the problem would be to get rid of the double agent, but the CIA could not authorize the execution, somewhat disingenuously. The agent handler for Thai Khac Chuyen, Sergeant Alvin Smith, identified him from the captured photo. It is interesting to note that Sergeant Smith was not a Special Forces soldier but rather an intelligence specialist who had been assigned to Project GAMMA and Special Forces. Sergeant Smith's supervisor, Captain Robert Marasco, ordered that the agent in question be brought in for questioning to include a polygraph test; which ominously the agent had not been given when recruited for Project GAMMA. If standard operating procedure had followed, the test would have already been conducted during his recruitment. Other doubts existed about the Vietnamese agent to include the fact that he was originally from North Vietnam, still had family north of the border, his English language skills were uncommonly good, and he had gone from job to job working for US forces fighting in South Vietnam, with trouble always following his departure.[20] Eventually Mr. Chuyen would undergo some ten days of rigorous interrogation and solitary confinement to include the use of polygraph tests and sodium pentathol, commonly known as "truth serum." The bad news, at least for the agent, was the fact that the polygraph tests would indicate that Mr. Chuyen was not telling the truth when he denied having compromised any Project GAMMA security details and working for the Viet Cong. Additionally the possibility existed that Chuyen was also working for the South Vietnamese intelligence service on the side, a triple agent. For the SF officers of B-57 and Project GAMMA, the leak that everyone had been looking for had been found. It would be distasteful but they knew what must be done; if Chuyen was turned over to the South Vietnamese Army or National Police, there was the chance he might go free due to the actions of another communist plant, and cause further damage and loss of American lives. Thus, in June of 1969 three of the B-57 officers would drug Thai Khac Chuyen, put him on a boat and take him out into Nha Trang Bay, not far from the 5th SFGA headquarters. He was shot twice in the head, weighed down with chains and dumped into the dark shark-infested waters of the South China Sea. Without a doubt a killing but one could make the argument the time tested standard procedure for identifying and eliminating a known double agent during wartime. An appropriate cover story was developed to explain the now obvious absence of the agent, if questions were asked he was believed to have disappeared after being sent on a mission behind enemy lines to test his loyalty to the cause. The Group Commander, Colonel Rheault, knew of the execution and approved the execution and cover story as above.[21] It was then that control of the affair began to be lost, never to be regained. Sergeant Smith, Mr. Chuyen's handler, began to be concerned for his security and safety, and sought sanctuary with the CIA office in Nha Trang. It would not take long for that to get out, even in a war zone, and soon all eight officers and noncommissioned officers involved in the execution, to include Colonel Rheault, were arrested on charges of premeditated murder, an offense punishable under the UCMJ, and confined in the infamous in country military facility known as the Long Binh Jail, or "LBJ" for obvious reasons.[22] To make matters worse, if that was possible at the time, was the fact that Colonel Rheault had given a four star general, General Abrams, the cover story when asked about the agent's whereabouts. Unfortunately, at least for 5th Special Forces Group in Vietnam, the commander of all U.S. Armed Forces in Vietnam that crucial year of 1969 was General Creighton W. Abrams. General Abrams, for better or worse, was perhaps one of the most forceful and dynamic leaders in the post-World War II Army. A graduate of the United States Military Academy, USMA, at West Point in 1936, Abrams has served in the old horse cavalry before the war, transitioning to tanks and armored forces during the war. Fighting in Europe, he soon proved himself to be one of the most capable young officers in the Army, serving in both the 1st and 4th Armored Divisions. Abrams became one of General George S. Patton, Junior's favorite officers. Patton reportedly said to a reporter during the war that "I'm supposed to be the best tank commander in the Army, but I have a peer—Abe Abrams."[23] High praise indeed. During the Battle of the Bulge, Abrams successfully led the tank and infantry task force that relieved the besieged 101st Airborne Division at Bastogne in Belgium. General Abrams came out of the war one of the most decorated officers, and was clearly a rising star in the Army's stable of combat hardened commanders. General Abrams would die in 1974 while serving as the Army Chief of Staff. The Army's high regard for him would be shown in the following decade by naming the newest and most modern tank, the M-1 tank, the Abrams. But along with all that capability, General Abrams was a man with strong opinions. His top intelligence officer in Vietnam, a classmate from USMA, has written that "This commonsensical, well-read, sophisticated man harbored some of the longest lasting, strangest, and most unusual prejudices. For one, he hated halfbacks, football halfbacks…Abrams held another unusual, and more serious, bias: he disliked paratroopers."[24] General Abrams had played sixth string football at the academy, fighting in the trenches of the line. This experience seems to have developed in him quite the distaste for "glamorous" half-backs, which at some point was transferred to airborne forces, to include Special Forces. In a profile piece on General Abrams in the New York Times from 1969, the writer claimed that the post-World War II Army was run by the "Airborne Club," which included the Special Forces, and that Abrams "as a square-shooting, traditional soldier, he was shocked when some of the ‘dirty tricks' customary in Green Beret activity became known to him forcefully," and believed that "battles should be fought with feet planted firmly on the ground and that making a fetish out of jumping out of airplanes is puerile."[25] It is probably not surprising that General Abrams never volunteered for or served a tour of duty with any airborne unit. I believe this is most unfortunate given the fact that he would have perhaps developed a better understanding of Airborne or Special Forces purposes and functions. Thus, when the Green Beret Affair would surface the Special Forces would most definitely not have a friend in court. The article 32 investigation held by the U.S. Army in Vietnam, before General Courts Martial against all eight, quickly became engulfed in a firestorm of publicity. Most of the American public, and the Special Forces, believed that Colonel Rheault and all involved had been made scapegoats for a matter that reflected poorly upon the Army. One former member of Special Forces in Vietnam commented to the author that "We were thunderstruck, and thought what did he [Colonel Rheault] do wrong?"[26] National newspapers and television picked up the story, most likely due to the involvement of the Special Forces, and the affair became another lighting rod for pro and anti-war feeling. The hearing in Vietnam became somewhat of a circus after one of the Army defense lawyers for the 8 soldiers, Judge Advocate General Captain John Stevens Berry, called General Abrams and CIA officials to the witness stand. Both declined to get involved in the proceedings and testify. Finally in September of 1969 the Secretary of the Army Stanley Resor announced to all that all charges would be dropped against the 8 soldiers charged since the CIA, in the interests of national security, had refused to make its personnel available as witnesses, therefore making any manner of a fair trial possible. Colonel Rheault requested immediate retirement from the Army and all others charged in the affair had their careers effectively ended, also leaving the service afterwards.[27] The affair continued to have unfortunate repercussions for Special Forces and the Army. General Abrams, after having Colonel Rheault arrested on murder charges, had one of his headquarters staff officers, Colonel Alexander Lemberes, assigned to take over command of the 5th Special Forces Group in Vietnam. The obvious problem with the assignment was that this officer was neither a qualified parachutist nor Special Forces officer; a bit like having a United Methodist preacher assigned to a Roman Catholic Church, rather nonsensical at best. When Colonel Lemberes attempted to wear an unearned Green Beret in his new command, the 5th SFGA Command Sergeant Major told him in no uncertain terms to take the beret off. Eventually the Army Chief of Staff, General Westmoreland, no stranger to the airborne, would step in and assign a qualified officer to command Special Forces in Vietnam. By the end of 1969 the Green Beret affair would be over, but questions raised and issues involved would come back again years later.[28] The 1969 Green Beret Affair brought up issues that continue to resonate in our Global War on Terror with SF continuing to operate in that shadowy world of unconventional warfare. Occasionally these issues surface and come to the attention of the press and American public as per the 3rd SFGA Special Forces Detachment that faced recent charges of premeditated murder for shooting an "enemy combatant." Last year on 13 October 2006 at the small village of Ster Kalay near the Pakistan border, members of Special Forces Operational Detachment Alpha 372 of 3rd Battalion, 3rd Special Forces Group, positively identified and killed Nawab Buntangyar, an Afghan national on the approved Operation Enduring Freedom target list. Spotted outside a residential compound, dressed in civilian clothes, not wearing a uniform, or carrying a weapon, Buntangyar was shot in the head while speaking the local police from 100 yards away by a concealed SF sniper. The enemy target had been involved in suicide and roadside bombing attacks; thus, the "take down" of the target, an enemy combatant, was considered "a textbook example of a classified mission completed in accordance with the American rules of engagement."[29] But for reasons that still remain vague, murder charges were preferred against the SF Detachment Commander, a Captain, and the Operations Sergeant, a Master Sergeant. Once again, just as in 1969, an Article 32 hearing was held, as per the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), before a General Court-Martial. Both soldiers were charged with violating Article 118 of the UCMJ, premeditated murder. Once again, SF soldiers became the objects of national press attention to include two ends of the ideological spectrum, the New York Times and Fox Network and Bill O'Rilley. However, after the hearing the two star general in charge of all SF at Fort Bragg dismissed the charges, an outcome just as in 1969.[30] An isolated incident perhaps but an illustrative example of the rules of engagement that our soldiers operate under on a daily basis, where a split second decision made on the battlefield to shoot or not shoot, can be reviewed later in the cool comfort of the court room. This is a level of oversight that will continue, even in the shadowy world of SF and unconventional warfare. Army Special Forces will continue to work with the CIA, FBI, and other agencies; commonly referred to in today's lexicon as Other Government Agencies, or OGAs. One could say some of the OGAs at times may not be bound by laws and rules but our Armed Forces are, make no doubt. Rules of engagement, carefully drawn up by military lawyers, will continue to govern what our troops can or cannot do, with legal review from higher always a possibility. Conclusion In the end what would the "Green Beret Affair" signify? Was it, as one author has suggested, a sort of a "Caine Mutiny of the Vietnam War," raising complex issues of morality, murder and professional jealousy?[31] Was the execution of an identified double, or perhaps triple, agent murder, or simply standard operating procedure old as warfare itself? Did General Abrams and the Army leap upon the case in order to make a point and discredit and discipline an unruly child, Special Forces? The affair was ultimately a tragedy. Committed and capable officers found themselves on two sides of a chasm in warfare; on one side World War II era officers to whom events were black and white, right and wrong. The other side was a younger generation, less respectful of rules and regulations, perhaps, but completely committed to winning. Both main players in the affair, Colonel Rheault and General Abrams, were graduates of the Military Academy at West Point, separated in time by 10 years. That is were the similarities end. The affair became a clash of philosophies, world views and personalities. Ultimately we will never know whether or not the executed agent, Thai Khac Chuyen, was truly working for the Communist Viet Cong, the American Special Forces, the South Vietnamese government, or a combination of all three. Evidence suggests that he was guilty of at least attempting to conceal the truth, a dangerous game, and one that led to his execution in the summer of 1969. He became just another causality in unconventional warfare. As we have seen above, the 1969 Vietnam "Green Beret Affair," is not unique as our forces continue to face similar moral and legal issues daily in the current Global War on Terror. However, as seen above, all Americans can take comfort in the fact that even our "best and brightest" remain subject to the law of war and military justice. That is one certainty in an uncertain war that will not change.
sources
MilitaryHistoryOnline.com